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INTRODUCTION
Congressman John Conyers, Jr.*
I am pleased to introduce this important edition of the University of the District of Columbia Law Review concerning the need to protect people's civil rights
in the criminal justice arena. Congress and the federal courts used to provide
protection for persons oppressed by regressive, and often racist, actions by state
legislatures and state courts. In light of recent attacks on individual rights emanating from the Congress and from the federal courts, however, civil fights advocates must now look with a new consciousness and awareness to the state
legislatures and to state courts. I suggest to judges and lawmakers, as well as to
criminal law scholars and practitioners, that this symposium is a timely signpost at
the junction where state and federal paths cross; for some specific destinations.
the signpost is pointing down the state court path.
As originally proposed, the United States Constitution had only a few provisions regarding criminal law. In creating the Bill of Rights, the drafters meaningfully introduced criminal justice issues into the Constitution. Of the twenty-three
rights noted in the first eight Constitutional Amendments, twelve concern criminal procedure. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures and prohibits the unconditional
issuance of search warrants.' The Fifth Amendment requires prosecution by
grand jury indictment for all infamous crimes, prohibits double jeopardy, and establishes a privilege against self-incrimination. 2 The Sixth Amendment provides
the right to a speedy trial, the right to an impartial jury in the state and district of
the alleged crime, the right to notice of the charge, the right to confront wvitnesses, the right to compel the testimony of favorable witnesses, and the right to
*

(D-MI).
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U.S. CONST. amend IV.
U.S. CONsT. amend V.
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assistance of counsel. 3 The Eighth Amendment4 prohibits excessive bail, and the

Fifth Amendment requires due process of law.
Until the Warren Court era, however, the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower

courts did not imbue these protections with any real meaning for criminal defendants in state proceedings. One hundred years after the adoption of the Four-

teenth Amendment, the Warren Court adopted the "selective incorporation"
doctrine. That doctrine requires the Court to look at the total right guaranteed
by the particular Bill of Rights provision and not only a single aspect of that right
nor the application of that right in a particular case. A right that the Court finds
to be fundamental will be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and,
hence, will be enforced against the states in every case according to the same
standards applied through the Bill or Rights to the federal government. With this
adoption of the selective incorporation doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court finally
began to note and remedy the lack of protections for defendants in state criminal
proceedings and prisoners in state institutions.
Applying this approach during the 1960's, the U.S. Supreme Court held the
following rights fundamental and, therefore, applicable to the states: the freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to have evidence obtained
in violation of that right excluded from criminal trials;5 the privilege against self
incrimination;6 the guarantee against double jeopardy;7 the right to assistance of
counsel;8 the right to a speedy trial; 9 the right to a jury trial;" ° the right to confront adverse witnesses;" the right to compulsory process for obtaining wit13
nesses; 12 and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
In light of these U.S. Supreme Court cases, it is ironic that the current trend in
federal courts and in the Congress is to assert control over criminal justice issues
in order to curtail civil rights. In the Berger and Rehnquist Courts, the justices
have issued a number of opinions diminishing and distinguishing hard-fought
criminal procedure gains. In this law review, student authors from the University
of the District of Columbia School of Law present in detail three of those opinions and examine the degree to which state courts have stepped in to preserve the
procedural rights of accused persons.
3
4

U.S. CONST. amend VI.
U.S. CONsT. amend VIII.

5 See Mapp v. Ohio, 368 U.S. 871 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
6 Malloy v. Hogan, 373 U.S. 1 (1964).
7 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
8 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 338 (1963).
9 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
10 Duncan v. Louisiana, 512 U.S. 1217 (1968).
11 Pointer v. Texas, 512 U.S. 1217 (1964).
12 Washington v. Texas, 374 U.S. 23 (1967).
13 Robinson v. California, 362 U.S. 927 (1962).
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On the legislative side of Capitol Hill, Congress is currently considering a juvenile crime bill, which would condition grant funds on states' changing their juvenile justice laws. The most egregious of these conditions is the requirement that,
for certain offenses, states prosecute all individuals fifteen and older as adults.
Other issues in which the Republican majority has attempted to minimize the
rights of oppressed people include (1) so-called habeas corpus reform, which ensures that more innocent people will be put to death and secures this country's
dubious distinction among the family of nations as a leader in executing its own
people; (2) so-called prison litigation reform, which prevents prisoners from suing
for even egregious living conditions; (3) the Defense of Marriage Act, which prohibits same-sex marriages (even though no state currently permits such unions);
and (4) so-called partial-birth abortion ban, which would render meaningless in
part women's rights to consult freely with their doctors and which would illegally
restrict women's constitutionally-protected choice to have an abortion.
Historically, when progressive forces in Congress have attempted to protect
civil rights, those who sought to oppress and to retrogress were quick to raise the
issue of federalism. Indeed, "states' rights" for decades was the rallying cry of
rabid racist segregationists. Consistent with that anti-democratic tradition, the
Republican majority in Congress today is using federalism as a red herringasserting federal control when they believe that states are not acting in a sufficiently draconian fashion. At the same time, these Congressional cynics hide behind "local control" (today's version of "states' rights") when the states are
denying rights or treating oppressed people badly.
The selective attack against progressive local control is nowhere more evident
than in Congressional treatment of the District of Columbia ("the District"). The
Congress, in key respects, has commandeered political control of the District. In
the area of criminal justice-traditionally an area of local control-the Congress
has been particularly aggressive in attempting to control the District. In particular, Congress has tried to impose the death penalty on the District, despite the
fact that District residents oppose the death penalty and have voted overwhelming against its imposition. The federal government is taking over the District's
prison system, attempting to lengthen sentences (radically disproportionate with
sentencing systems in the fifty states), and is seeking to disperse D.C. prisoners to
cells all over the country. Perhaps these efforts should come as no surprise given
that the federal government has always prosecuted all criminal cases (other than
traffic offenses) in the District of Columbia. Readers of this law review should
recognize that, unlike all other jurisdictions, the District has no local prosecutors
(and, of course, no voting representation in the Congress).
The preceding review of federalism in our national civil rights struggle brings
me back to this edition of the University of the District of Columbia Law Review.
By virtue of its position as the public law school in the nation's capital, the University of the District of Columbia School of Law is uniquely positioned to con-
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sider the problems of federalism and the protection of procedural rights of people
who lack federal legal protection and yet stand accused of criminal conduct. This
edition of the University of the District of Columbia Law Review focuses on the
availability of state-level responses to recent reversals of federal criminal procedural protections. Thus, this edition includes an article by Milton C. Lee, Jr, a
faculty member at the University of the District of Columbia School of Law and
presently a hearing commissioner in D.C. Superior Court, and an essay by
Jonathan M. Smith, the Executive Director of the D.C. Prisoner Legal Services,
and three student comments. Mr. Lee's article analyzes the fairly restrictive approach taken by the federal rules relating to discovery in criminal cases and contrasts that approach with experiments in various states to liberalize criminal
discovery rules. Mr. Smith's essay focuses on federal efforts to control and restrict the rights of accused and convicted people in the District of Columbia. This
essay addresses, among other things, the current proposal to devise federal sentencing guidelines for the District of Columbia and the removal of D.C. prisoners
into the federal system.
As noted above, three University of the District of Columbia School of Law
students have contributed comments that address, respectively, three U.S.
Supreme Court cases that have limited the rights of accused persons. The students explore state court rulings, based on state constitutional interpretations,
that retain or protect the rights of the accused. Specifically, Claudia Barbieri
examines Oregon v. Elstad,'4 a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
confession obtained prior to the administration of Miranda warnings does not
taint and render inadmissable subsequent, post-warning statements by the accused. In Elstad, the Court exterminated the established and commonsensical
"cat-out-of-the-bag" notion that suspects who provided confessions obtained illegally by the police would thereafter continue to make incriminating statements,
notwithstanding an intervening warning by police. Ms. Barbieri provides a useful
tour of state-court responses to Elstad. John Terzano reviews Moran v.
Burbine,15 a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that where police tell a
criminally accused's lawyer that they are not going to question the accused, and
subsequently question the accused, fail to inform the accused that counsel has
been retained for and has tried to communicate with him or her, that the confession obtained and derived from the deceitful police conduct does not violate the
Miranda principles. Mr. Terzano notes that our criminal justice system is an accusatorial, not inquisitorial, system. However, where the U.S. Supreme Court endorses deceitful police conduct, Mr. Terzano argues that the system has
necessarily changed from an accusatorial to an inquisitorial system. He then illustrates a few state responses that have rejected the Moran v. Burbine decision,
14 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
15 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1984).
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most notably in Illinois and in Minnesota. Ron Woodman presents a couple of
state responses to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Colorado i Connelly.16
Connelly created a per se rule that requires police coercion as a requisite predicate to finding a confession voluntary for the purposes of Miranda and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Mr. Woodman briefly touches on New
Jersey's response that requires the government to meet a higher standard of
proof when determining whether a confession was voluntarily given. However,
the focus of his comment illustrates Hawaii's bold departure from Connelly. Hawaii returned to the totality of circumstances test to determine voluntariness and
embraced Justice Brennan's notion of increased state agency accountability, applicable not only to police, but to courts and prosecutors.
It is my hope that after reviewing the materials included in the law review,
readers will feel moved to exercise their rights to develop and use state court
precedents and remedies to protect the rights of accused persons and prisoners.
We cannot simply give up because the current Congress shows little to no concer for these rights. Rather, we must forge ahead and look for new, creative
solutions to these age-old problems. If the federal courts and federal legislature
are no longer available for redress, we must move the fight to state courts and
state legislatures.

16

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).

